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ABSTRACT
Simulated docking maneuvers were performed to assess the
effect of initial velocity on docking failure rate, mission
duration, and Av (fuel consumption). Subjects performed
simulated docking maneuvers of an orbital maneuvering
vehicle (OMV) to a space station. The effect of the
removal of the range and rate displays (simulating a ranging
instrumentation failure) was also examined. Naive subjects
were capable of achieving a high success rate in performing
simulated docking maneuvers without extensive training.
Failure rate was a function of individual differences; there
was no treatment effect on failure rate. The amount of time
subjects reserved for final approach increased with starting
velocity. Piloting of docking maneuvers was not
significantly affected in any way by the removal of range
and rate displays. Radial impulse was significant both by
subject and by treatment. NASA's "0.1% rule", dictating an
approach rate no greater than 0.1% of the range, is seen to
be overly conservative for nominal docking missions.
INTRODUCTION
The relative motion of Orbital Maneuvering Vehicles
(OMVs) with respect to a space station is very difficult to
visualize because of non-linearities in the governing
equations of motion. For example, purely posigrade thrusts
ultimately yield upward and then backward motion with
respect to a "stationary" target such as a space station.
Conversely, retrograde burns ultimately produce downward
and forward motion. These paths are curvilinear and it is
possible to "bounce" one's way around an orbit. While
these burns also alter the original period, purely radial
thrusts--which also provide fore and aft relative motion'-do
not affect the vehicle's orbital period. Simulation
experiments are necessary to better understand pilot
response to these non-intuitive phenomena.
BACKGROUND
Proximity operations (PROX OPS) are defined as any and
all activities occurring within a one kilometer sphere of the
space station. Among these are rendezvous, docking, and
rescue maneuvers. Simulations (and actual performance) of
rendezvousand dockingmaneuvers began intheGemini
erainpreparationforthetwo dockingmaneuversrequired
fora manned missiontothemoon. Theseoperationswere
performed slowly to increasesafetymarginsinthe event of
an incorrect burn and to minimize fuel usage. The
procedures were designed to minimize risk at the expense
of time. The fact that a rendezvous may require anywhere
from several hours to several days to perform9 or that a
docking may take as long as several hours was not a
concern in the Gemini and Apollo programs. Mission
durations were set to be-long enough to accomplish all
mission objectives. If, due to a miscalculation or
exceptional pilot performance, a maneuver was completed
in less time than allocated, free time had essentially just
been created. A job queue as such did not exist.
The space shuttle/space station environment will be highly
operational to support sustained human productivity on
orbit. Retrieval and re-insertion of satellites and other
orbital missions will become routine. Every hour a
erewperson is spending on a docking maneuver is an hour
s/he is not spending on some other task. There is a
financial conszderation in addition to the productivity issue.
To date, the monetary cost of a crewmember's time has not
been given much consideration in the U.S. space program.
Recently, the value of $35,000 was cited as the cost of an
hour of astronaut time on-orbit. 2 NASA guidelines
stipulate that a crewperson on the space station will monitor'
all manned approaches in addition to the pilot in the vehicle
so this one hour docking maneuver is actually worth
$70,000. 9 Since others on both the station and the shuttle
may be passively monitoring all or part of the approach, the
cost of a one hour docking maneuver may easily rise to
beyond $150,000 not including the cost of fuel and other
expendables. With an estimated 5-6 dockings of the shuttle
to the station each year for support 12, the annual cost of
docking to the space station may approach $1,000,000.
The addition of OMV, orbital transfer vehicle (OTV), and
ESA free flyer traffic will further increase this cost.
Current shuttle rendezvous guidelines are very conservative
suggesting that a "0.1% rule" be followed. This rule
dictates that the shuttle's relative closing velocity with
respect to the space station (or some other target) should be
limited to a value no greater than 0.1% of its range per
second. For example, at a range of 1000 meters, the
velocity should be 1 meter per second. After 100 seconds,
the shuttle arrives at a range of 900 meters and the range
rate is decreased to 0.9 m/s. 10 A docking from an initial
range of one kilometer would take about one hour to
complete if this guideline were followed. This is an
Similar discussion available as paper 89-0400 from the AIAA 27th Aerospace Sciences Meeting
and in a future issue of the Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets.
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arbitrary rule of thumb designed to afford the pilot a
sufficient safety margin with which to successfully perform
the maneuver. Very little rigorous human factors studies
were performed to determine what the man-in-the-loop
requirements or restrictions might be.
Another area in which data suggest the need for further
evaluation of current docking guidelines is workload.
Workload has been under intensive scrutiny in the airline
industry for some time, Here, crew inactivity may be
caused by cockpit automation. Related concerns include
the potential for automation to reduce crew alertness or
cause them to be easily distracted.13 Certain recent
airline accidents are interpreted to have been automation-
induced and they may be preventable in the future by
putting the human "into a more active role in the control
loop". 14 Pilot-astronauts and spacecraft are analogous to
airline pilots and aircraft and this workload level concern is
relevant to space operations as well. Research has shown
that tasks containing relatively long periods of inactivity are
perceived as being high in workload. 1 Both too many and
too few inputs required per unit time are potentially
hazardous. Minimizing workload by mandating a slow
approach velocity is not necessarily the safest approach.
Maintaining slow vehicle velocities serves to lengthen the
safe range of human reaction time and reduce the likelihood
of frenzied activity which may tend toward the instigation
of (potentially tragic) errors. This is one of the reasons for
speed limits on the nation's highways and is also why roads
are not designed with a large number of tight, contiguous S-
curves, which increase workload. However, too slow
velocities may lead to long periods of inactivity which also
may increase the incidence of accidents. To make use of
the highway analogy again, curves are installed not only
around obstacles but also at appropriate intervals to
"awaken" the drivers whose attention may have lapsed due
to the relatively mindless piloting of an automobile down a
straight road for too long. In short, both too many and too
few inputs required per unit time are potentially hazardous.
Again, minimizing workload is not necessarily the safest
approach.
Little rigorous human factors testing has been conducted to
date in the area of spacecraft docking maneuvers. It has
routinely been assumed that in spaceflight--and other
activities requiring manual control--that the human is such
a marvelous machine that it can adapt to any operational
environment. With the awareness of the aforementioned
concerns of error incidence, time and productivity issues,
and cost, it is time to perform some experiments with which
to better understand these considerations in the hopes of
alleviating or minimizing potential problems.
The author has been involved with human factors
investigations of proximity operations for a number of
years. Previous work in a spacecraft flight simulator with
naive test subjects yielded remarkable results concerning
the ability to dock a manned OMV to the space station.
While NASA policy stipulates the requirement of 1,000
hours of high perfomvance jet pilot experience for its pilots,
none of the author's test subjects had any jet pilot
experience. Nevertheless, successful dockings were
achieved in less than 4% of the time that would have been
obtained had the 0.1% rule been followed. Mission costs
were cut substantially as well. In essence, students without
the benefit of jet pilot experience or (except for one subject)
any kind of flight training, instruction in orbital mechanics
effects (except for another subject), or any form of NASA
training, achieved a high success rate "speeding" toward the
space station in simulated dockings. Indeed, one simulator
study claims that almost anyone can perform a successful
docking maneuver with great precision with documented
cases including data from secretaries and experienced
pilots. 8
This study was a partial replication of the earlier one. 2
While the two studies were similar in that they both sought
to examine the effect of different docking velocities on
failure rate, fuel consumption, and mission duration, there
were enough fundamental differences in methodology,
hardware, and software to justify a new study. These
differences include the addition of an accurate star field in
the background of the current study, a different thruster
control system, different environments, different computers
and displays, and different points of view. (The earlier
study consisted of a pilot flying his craft toward the station
while the current study involves remotely controlled
docking.)
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS AND APPARATUS
This experiment was conducted in the Space Station
Proximity Operations (PROX OPS) Simulator at
NASA/Ames Research Center. The simulator primarily
consists of one 3-degree-of-freedom hand controller and
three "windows" on which the computer-generated imagery
is presented. Buttons on the hand controller are used to
select the thruster acceleration values for each axis among
choices of 0.01, 0.1 and 1.0 rrds. Detailed descriptions of
the simulator are available elsewhere.4,5,6, 7
Test subjects were required to "fly" simulated remote
docking maneuvers of an OMV to a space station in a 270
nautical mile orbit beginning from an initial range of 304.8
m (1,000 It) on the -V-bar (along the velocity vector in the
minus direction). A repeated measures design was used
with ten missions flown at each of five initial velocities:
0.3, 3.0, 5.0, 7.0, and 9.0 m/s. From this direction, orbital
mechanics effects cause the vehicle to rise. The subjects
were instructed to counteract this tendency by making
downward burns to accomplish a successful docking. The
order that these velocities were presented was randomized
and was different for each subject. Subjects were requested
to resist boredom at the slowest velocity and were
prohibited from accelerating to decrease the mission
duration. In addition, each subject also performed ten
attempts without the benefit of operational range and rate
displays. These trials were performed last (at an initial
velocity of 3 m/s) as they were presumed to be the most
difficult and the trials with the displays would serve as
practice.
Each subject was issued a training manual for perusal prior
to experimentation. Training consisted of performing ten
successful dockings with an initial velocity of 3.0 m/s.
Once ten successful dockings were achieved, training was
considered complete and data collection began.
Certain range and rate conditions had to be satisfied for a
docking attempt to be considered successful. These were: a
forward range of 2.0 m with an approach velocity no
greater than 0.15 m/s, and up/down and left/fight ranges
and rates with absolute values that did not exceed 0.23 m
and 0.06 m/s respectively. These values were derived from
the proceedings of a NASA workshop on rendezvous and
docking and were believed to be the most recent. 11
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RESULTS
Eight male subjects were tested for approximately six hours
each. Time considerations prevented some of the subjects
from completing all ten of the rims at 0.3 m/s but no subject
performed fewer than eight. Qualitative data in the form of
comments by the subjects in addition to quantitative data
concerning mission duration, fuel consumption, and error
incidence were recorded. Only one of the subjects had
previous pilot experience (subject three).
The values for per cent unsuccessful were determined by
dividing the number of failed missions for each subject by
the number attempted and multiplying by 100. These
values were then summed which is why the total sometimes
exceeded 100%. (See Figure 1.) While most of the
unsuccessful missions were not tragic in nature, for
experimental purposes, "unsuccessful" was operationally
defined as not satisfying the terminal range and rate
conditions mentioned earlier.
% UnsuccessfUl
2_3
150
% 1130
50
0
0.3 3 5 7 9 "No Display
Initial Condition
(m/s)
[: Sub ct,Sobj '; SubjeoL6SoUj   5" ubJ ''Iubject 3 ubject 2 ubject l
Figure 1--Per Cent Unsuccessful by Initial Condition
The data were analyzed across initial conditions and across
subjects. By initial condition, the values for per cent
unsuccessful ranged from 6.70% (5 "accidents") at 0.3 m/s
to 21.25% (17 unsuccessful) at both 7 and 9 m/s. The
corresponding values by subject were 1.68% (1 failure) for
Subject 8 to 30.0% (18 failures) for Subject 5. The average
failure rate by subject or initial condition was 13.2%. A
two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on
these data with subject and initial condition (velocity) as
factors. Only the between subject data were significant
with an F-ratio of F(7,35)=3.38 (p=.007).
Median scores for mission duration and total impulse were
plotted as functions of initial condition. The units for these
measurements are seconds (s), and meters per second (m/s).
Meters per second are the units for Av which is the change
in velocity imparted to the vehicle. By using the total
impulse as the value for fuel usage, the mass of the vehicle
becomes immaterial and the fuel consumption can be scaled
for a vehicle of any mass. These data appear in figures 2-3.
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Figure 2--Mission Duration Medians by Initial Condition
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Figure 3--Total Impulse Medians by Initial Condition
Since mission duration and total impulse were heavily
influenced by the initial velocity of the vehicle, the data for
these parameters are more important for mission operations
considerations than for human performance analyses.
Consequently, mission duration and total impulse were
"normalized" by subtracting out appropriate reference
values. The reference value for mission duration was
computed by dividing the initial range by the initial
velocity. This provides a theoretical minimum time for a
linear, one-dimensional system (which does not
characterize the orbital environment) with impulsive start
and stop. The parameter thus obtained is termed "reserve
time" as this is the time the subject reserves for himself in
order to successfully dock.
In a similar fashion, the starting impulse and the impulses
used to decelerate the vehicle were subtracted from the total
impulse to arrive at the value used to maintain the OMV
near the V-bar. (Since the OMV rarely came to a full stop,
the vehicle was assumed to have a residual velocity of 0.1
m/s for this calculation.) This derived parameter was
termed "radial impulse" as this was the sum of the radial
impulses used to achieve a successful docking.
Reserve time medians averaged over all subjects ranged
from a low of -22.2 s at 0.3 m/s to a high of 108.4 s with
the No Display trials. (A negative reserve time was caused
by reducing the altitude of the OMV for so long that its
orbital period was significantly shorter from that of the
station and it gained some forward velocity.) Across
treatments, the averages ranged from 23.8 s (Subject 4) to
114 s (Subject 1). For the reserve time medians, the
omnibus F test produced ratios of F(5,35)=6.73 (p<.001)
and F(7,35)=2.23 (p=.055) for the between treatment and
between subject data respectively. (See Figure 4.)
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Figure 4--Reserve Time Medians by Initial Condition
The F-ratios for radial impulse medians were F(5,35)=2.81
(p=.031) and F(7,35)=6.68 (p<.001) for between treatment
and between subject analyses. Averages of medians across
subjects ranged from 1.02 m/s at 0.3 m/s to 1,77 m/s at 9
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m/s. Across treatments, the values varied from 0.75 m/s for
subject three to 2.1 m/s for subject five with an average of
1.26 m/s. (See Figure 5.)
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Two-way ANOVAs were also conducted for the three
parameters using only the 3 m/s and No Display (also 3
m/s) medians to determine the effect of the removal of the
displays. None of these F ratios proved significant.
DISCUS S ION--ANALYSIS
Before discussing the results in any detail, it must be
emphasized that none of the subjects had any background
or experience with orbital mechanics effects or any high
performance jet flight training. The data show how well
naive subjects can do without either of these skills. Also,
none of the pilots had access to any orbital trajectory
planning device to assist them with their docking missions.
(This is being planned for a future study.) It is expected
that NASA pilots with these skills, and more, could easily
surpass the best mission duration, fuel consumption, and
success rate values achieved here. Subjects and NASA
pilots alike can be trained to virtually any desired design
point for any, or all, of the three parameters before they are
considered competent to perform an actual doc__n.g:.
The qualitative comments clearly indicated extreme dislike
for the trials at the slowest velocity and preference for any
of the other treatments, especially the runs without the
range and rate displays. However, the anxiety associated
with the performance of an actual space mission may
alleviate some of the boredom and help time "fly".
The data obtained for the unsuccessful missions,
categorized by initial condition and by test subject, show
that while the incidence of accidents appears to increase
with initial velocity, this trend was not statistically
significant. Only the subject effect was significant.
Subjects had different risk profiles; some were risk prone
and some were risk averse. In actuality, docking velocities
would not be chosen because of their associated success
rate in simulations. Rather, the pilots would be chosen by
their established success rate in simulated maneuvers.
Unlike other vehicles such as aircraft or automobiles where
the landing scheme or speed limit must be designed to
safely accommodate the worst pilots (drivers), for
spacecraft and space missions, "the simulator defines the
user population rather than vice versa." A velocity would
not be selected because it induced the lowest failure rate
averaged over all subjects, rather, those who performed the
best in the simulated mission would be chosen to perform
the actual mission. 4
The analysisof varianceperformed on reservetime
medians showed thatreservetimeincreasedwith initial
velocitywithoutany statisticalsignificanceamong test
subjects.While missiondurationvariedinverselywith
initial velocity, reserve time increased monotonically with
initial velocity with the no display runs performed at 3 m/s
requiring more reserve time than the runs at 9 m/s. This
effect was mostly due to the equations of motion governing
orbital flight. By traveling at a different altitude from the
station, forward velocity was obtained without the use of
fuel. During the longer (slower) missions, orbital
mechanics effects had more time to work to the subjects'
advantage allowing more velocity to be accumulated and
consequently reducing the time the pilot reserved to
successfully accomplish the mission.
The radialimpulsedatawere significantbothby subject
and by treatment.This indicatesthatnot only were
differentamountsoffuelrequiredtocompensateforanon-
linearenvironmentdependingupon theinitialvelocity,but
thatsome subjectswere significantlymore fuelefficient
th.anotherswhen itcame toapplyingtheseradialburns.
The fact that removal of the range and raie displays at 3 m/s
did not significantly affect the data for any of the
parameters is very important. This indicates that such
displays, while probably psychologically comforting, were
redundant in a real-life situation when combined with the
visual image of the approaching vehicle and were
unnecessary for nominal dockings. They did not help the
test subjects perform more rapid, more fuel efficient, or
. safer dockings. They would most likely be more useful in
anomalous situations. These range and rate data would be
produced by a sophisticated and expensive ranging system
which the current space shuttle does not possess and it is
deemed too expensive to retrofit the shuttle to include it.
This lends support to the view that installing such a system
on the shuttle is not worth the time, money, or effort since
these displays apparently do not produce any significant
benefit in simulated nominal missions. The OMV is
expected to have such a ranging system (which is one of the
reasons it was used as the test vehicle in this study) and
these data would be required for an automatic system to
function as well.
CONCLUSIONS
• The amount of time pilots reserved for final approach
increased with starting velocity. The slower forward
velocities allowed more time for the orbital mechanics
effects to play a role and were thus used to the pilot's
advantage in gaining forward velocity for free.
• Performance of simulated remote piloting of docking
maneuvers was not significantly affected in any way by the
removal of the range and rate displays.
• The initial condition significantly affected the subjects'
use of reserve time and radial impulse.
• The "0.1% Rule" for docking is overly conservative
from a human performance point of view.
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